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THE NATURAL TERMINATION OF ESTATES.
I. DIRECT LiITATIONS-REGULAR TERMINATION UPON THE
HAPPENING OF ONE EVENT.
Estates in land and chattels real may be determined upon
the happening of one event. Such interests are those which
continue to the utmost period to which they are extended by
the limitation or gift. They have been called "absolute" es-
tates, because they are unaffected by any collateral limitations
or any express conditions.'
Of the four chief categories of estates from the standpoint
of quantity of interest-the fee simple, fee tail, life estate and
chattel real-only one, the fee simple, is not in contemplation
of law assumed to await a natural expiration. It is regarded
as an infinite interest. In Littleton's words, "Tenant in fee
simple is he which hath lands in fee simple to hold to himself
and his heirs forever." 2 It is true that the fee simple is subject
to escheat on death of the tenant intestate without heirs. But
as was said in the leading case of Pells v. Bro-wn, "the law
doth not expect the determination of a fee by his [the tenant's]
dying without heirs." s It was because the fee simple was con-
ceived of as an infinite interest that the common law courts
refused to countenance the idea that any interest could be
mounted upon a fee.4 Once a fee was given, the feoffor had
Preston: 1 Estates. 125. But as a general rule the term "absolute" is
applied only to unmodified fees.
'Littleton: Tenures, Sees. x, ii. See also Blackstone: Ir Comm. ;o4;
Tiffany: Real Prop., 43; Digby: Hist. of Law of Real Prop. (5th Ed.), 6o;
"Proprietary rights in land are, 'we may say, projected upon the plane of
time. The category of quantity of duration is applied to them. The life
tenant's rights are a finite quantty; the fee tenant's rights are an infinite
or potentially infinite quantity; we see a difference in respect of duration
and this is the one fundamental difference." Poll & Mait.: 2 Hist. Eng. Law
(2d Ed.), zo.
'Cro. Jac. 5og. "'The law does not presume failure of heirs and it
therefore presumes that a fee simple will in fact endure forever. In this
respect the quantum of a fee simple is greater than the quantum of all
modified fees, which, though they may endure forever, are not presumed
by the law to do so." Challis: Real Prop. (3d. Ed.), 220.
'Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 59o: Williams. J., in Egerton v. Massey, 3
C. B., N. S., 338; Blanchard -.. Blanchard, I Allen 223; Loddington v. Kline,
x Salk. 224.
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nothing more to give; the law would not contemplate the occur-
rence of a contingency upon which he might have more to give.
The. fee tail is sharply distinguished from the fee simple
in this respect. It is a fee "cut down" ' to a wholly finite in-
terest; an estate whose contemplated natural expiration is the
very law of its being. The Statute De Donis,0 by force of
which the fee tail arose, was directed primarily not to the crea-
tion but to the determination of such estates. It sought to
secure-and for about two hundred 'years was successful in
securing-that whenever an estate was conveyed to a man and
the heirs of his body the estate should cease only when the
heirs of his body became extinct. So long as the fee tail re-
mains a fee tail it is subject, when recognized today, to terming-
tion in this way. Such termination, by the extinction of the
issue, is as clearly termination by natural expiration as is
termination of a life estate by death of the life tenant.7  The
life or duration of the fee tail is, so to speak, the life or dura-
tion of that stock of descent, general or limited, to which it is
given.8 When that expires the estate ipso facto comes to an
end as an estate tail. If a'nything remains or flows out'of it
it is only a life estate of a special character known as a tenancy
in tail after possibility of issue extinct."0
An estate for life, in the ordinary sense, as it is an estate
which is measured by the life or lives of one or more persons,"1
'See Leake: Property in Land (2d Ed.), 26.
"'And note that this word (talliore) is the sanie as to set to some
certainty,- . . . what issue shall inherit by force of such gifts, and how
long the inheritance shall endure." Littleton: Tenures, Sec. M8."
'A fee tail is a particular estate. A -remainder may be limited upon
it; and there is a reversion in the donor. Co.: Lit. 22a, 22b; Challis: Real
Prop. (3d Ed.), 298. Digby: Hist. Real Prop. (5th Ed.), 224, 225. In
this respect the fee tail differs from the fee simple absolute and all modified
fees, which can never be regarded in any proper sense as particular estates.
'Littleton: Tenures, i8; Digby: Hist. Real Prop. (5th Ed.), 25o.
'Williams: Real Property (22d Ed.), go.
"See Littleton: Tenures, Sees. 32, 33. A tenint in tail after possibility
of issue extinct -could not suffer a common recovery, Moreover, he cannot-
at the present day make any disposition under the- English Finei and Re-
coveries Act. Challis: Real Prop. (3d Ed.), 314. The estate is distinguish-
able from the ordinary life estate in that the tenant can commit waste.
Littleton: Tenures, Sec. 34.
" Thus Challis: Real Property (3d Ed.), 338, divides estates for life
THE NATURAL TERMINATION OF ESTATES
affords almost the readiest illustration of the estate whose de-
termination is by natural expiration. IJ.i\es in being have fre-
quently been compared to burning candles. They must all burn
out in time. So when the life or lives that measure the duration
of a given estate have burned out the estate is naturally at an
end.
If the legal analysis of estates were to be changed some
might be found to say that whenever a life- estate is not
for the life of the tenant himself but is pur autre zie, or for
joint lives, or for the life of the longest liver of several persons,
it might well be spoken of as a life estate subject to collateral
limitation or at least to determination by collateral lives.12 But
the practice of treating the terms "tenant for life" or "life
tenant" as including both a tenant for the term of his own life
and the tenant for the term of another's life is too deeply rooted
to make this at all desirable." Littleton treated the two in-
terests as co-ordinate and of the same general character. "Tenant
for term of life, is where a man letteth lands and tenements
to another for term of the life of the lessee, or for term of the
life of another-man. In this case the lessee is tenant for term
of life." 14 and this treatment has been the practice of writers
on the law of real property ever since.1 5
into, "(x) An estate for the life of the tenant himself; (2) An estate for
tie life of another person, or pur autre vie; (3) An estate for the joint
lives of several persons; and (4) An estate for the life of the longest
liver of several persons."
33 The fact that an estate pur autre vie usually arises from assignment
of an estate for tenant's own life, in other words, is an estate for life
transferred would, alone, make the orthodox treatment of that interest
natural. But such an estate may also be created de novo. Moreover, whether
created by assignment or de novo, it is subject to incidents which dis-
tinguish it from the estate for tenant's own life. It was not regarded in
early times as a freehold. See Williams: Real Prop. (2zd Ed.), 132.
" Moreover, it would involve some special difficulties of its own. For
example, when an estate was measured by the lives of the tenant him-
self and of another person or persons and the tenant survived the other
lives, it would be an estate for life simply, but if the tenant died first it
would resemble, and for the residue of the term become, an estate put
atire vie.. Co.: Lit. 416; Leake: Prop. in Land (2d Ed.), r44.
Littleton: Tenures, Sec. 56.
Co.: Lit. 41b. Blackstone: IT Comm. 12o; Leake: Prop. in Land (2d
Ed.), 44. Washburn: Real Prop., Sees. 220, 221; Tiffany: Real Prop,
70. But see Challis: Real Prop. (3d Ed.), 339,.357; he gives distinct'chapters
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The manner of termination of an -estate for the life of
another is paralleled by the mannei of termination of the "base
fee"-using that term in this place not as synonymous with
determinable fee or fee on collateral limitation, 16 but in the
restricted sense in which it is employed by such English writers
as Challis and Leake. 17 A base fee so considered is in effect a
fee tail transferrect in such manner as not to bar the remainder
or reversion but to give to the transferee an estate so long as
the original donee shall have heirs of his body. 8 The estate
pur autre sie naturally terminates or expires when the person
by whose life time it is measured dies. So here, the base fee
naturally terminates when the line of issue by which it is meas-
ured becomes extinct.'
0
Finally chattels real, when unqualified and subject to no
condition, may be said to have a natural termination. As to its
contintiance, says Preston, a chattel real is to be considered an
to consideration of estates for the life of the tenant, and estates pur autre
vze.
. It is generally used in this way in this country. 17 Harv. L Rev.,
2c6; Mass. Land. Court Decisions, p. 210; Tiffany: Real Prop., p. i9p. For
such usage there is authority no less respectable than Lord Coke himself.
io Co. 97'b; Co.: Lit. ib; Challis: Real Prop. (3d Ed.), 62, 63, and see
Digby: Hist. Law Real Prop. (5th Ed.), 224.
" The base fee in this restricted sense of the term cannot be created
by original grant, or "mere limitation." Challis: Real Prop. (3d Ed.), 325.
Leake: Prop. in Land (2d Ed.), 231, observes that a base fee may co-
exist with a reversion or remainder by "matter ex post facto," though it
cannot be thus limited by an original grant. But a determinable fee, to A
and his heirs so long as B has heirs of his body, can be created by mere
limitation. See the discussions appended in Seymour's Case, zo Co. 95b;
Challis: Real Prop. (3d Ed.), 330.
" Challis, who has contributed much to our knowledge of the base
fee, describes it as follows in his Real Property (3d Ed.), 325: "The
earliest (not to say the only) attempt to define the term base fee with
which the present writer is acquainted is that given by Plowden; and his
definition is substantially as follows: A base fee is a fee descendible to
the heirs general upon which subsists a remainder or reversion in fee
simple. The conditions laid down by this definition can only be fulfilled
by conversion of a fee tail into a fee descendible to the heirs general, by
some method which does not destroy the remainder or reversion previously-
subsisting upon the fee tail. For no fee descendible to the heirs general
which arises by mere limitation, can have subsisting upon it any remainder
or reversion." See also Leake: Prop. in Land (2d Ed.), 28, 231, and note
how the "Fines and Recoveries Act" has further limited the force of the
term.
' Leake: Prop. in Land (2d Ed.), 28 Seymour's Case, zo Co. 95b.
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absolute estate. It is an estate "which in point Qf limitation will
certainly continue to the end of that period" for which it was
given.20 The end is certainly known, this being the prime char-
acteristic which distinguishes estates for years from other in-
terests. "For regularly in every lease for years the term must
have a certain beginning and a certain end." 21
II. COLLATERAL LIMITATIONS-REGULAR TERMINATION UPON
THE HAPPENING OF EITHER OF Two EVENTS.
The determination of istates whose quantum is designated
by what is usually termed a "collateral limitation," a "special
limitation" or more briefly-though at the expense of clearness-
a "limitation" requires separate consideration. 22 But it may
be emphasized at the outset that the termination of such estates
is on all fours with the termination of the estates previously
considered. It is termination by natural expiration. Any other
conception of the determination of such estates is irreconcilable
with certain of the most fundamental rules of the common law,
particularly with the rule that no future interest can be limited
in derogation of a prior estate.
What makes desirable, if not necessary, this separate con-
sideration is the fact that such estates may naturally determine
upon the happening of more than one event.23 A life estate for
the tenant's own life determines with the death of thG.tenant.
' Preston: I Estates, 126.
' Bishop of Bath's Case, 6 Co. 34b. Duration, however, may be lim-
ited by reference, as well as expressly. The case continues: "Yet if by
reference to a certainty it may be made certain it suffiLeth. For example,
if A leaseth his land to B for so many years as B hath in the manor of
Dale and B hath then a term in the manor of Dale for ten years, this is a
good lease by A to B of the land of A for ten years."
'Littleton used none of these terms, but instead the term "condition
in law." Tenures, Sec. s8o. Coke entirely opposed this usage. In dis-
cussing this section of Littleton, he says: "Here Littleton termeth words
of limitation to be conditions in law: for his first example is, 'During the
coverture between them.' This word (durante) is properlyr a word of limi-
tation, as durante viduitate. . . . And properly a condition in law is, as
hath been said, where the law createth the same without any expresse words."
Co.: Lit. 234b.
'Indeed it appears that they may be so limited as to determine upon
the happening of any one of several events. Preston: I Estates, 26.
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An estate pur aznire vie determines with the death of cestui que
vie. A fee tail and a base fee determine upon the extinction" of
issue. In all of these cases the event is single. A determinable
life estate on the other hmd-for example an estate to A so
long as she remains the widow of B-determines upon either
the death or remarriage of A. And so with a determinable fee
tail, a determinable base fee,2-4 or a determinable estate for
years. The determinable fee simple is in a case by itself. The
duality of the events affecting this estate is not that of determin-
ation on direct or collateral limitation. For the law will never
expect its determination by failure of heirs, any more than it
will expect the determination of a fee simple absolute on such
an event. 21 In that respect it is a potentially infinite interest.
A conveyance of a determinable fee "exhausts the fee" as com-
pletely as does a conveyance of a fee simple absolute. But the
law may contemplate its determination by the happening of the
collateral contingency though it insists that the contingency must
be one that may never happen.20  The determinable fee, then,
is one which will determine on the happening of a collateral
"A determinable fee tail so transferred as to bar -the rights of the.
issue in tail only, leaving unaffected the rights of persons entitled in re-
version or remaindeir, might be called a determinable base fee, or a base
fee with a proviso for cesser. Cf. Leake: Prop. in Land (2d Ed.), 164,
and his examples of provisos for cesser.
"The words in Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, that "one fee cannot
be in remainder after another; for the law doth not expect the determina-
tion of a fee by his dying without heirs, and therefore cannot appoint a
remainder to be given upon determination thereof," necessarily include
all modified fees. It is believed that no authority will be found to say that
the law will expect a failure of heirs in case of any modified fee, either
determinable or on condition. Co.: Lit. iSa, says of Littleton's statement,
"that a man cannot have a more large or greater estate than fee simple."
(Litt., Sec. 18), "This doth extend as well to fee simples conditional and
qualified, as to fee simples pure and absolute. For our author speaketh
here of the ampleness and greatness of the estate, and not of the per-
durableness of the same. And he, that -bath a fee simple conditional or
qualified, hath as ample and great an estate, as he that hath a fee simple
absolute; so as the diversity appeareth between the quantity and quality
of the estate."
"Challis: Real Prop. (3d Ed.), 220. "It is a quality of this estate,
while it falls under this denomination, that it is liable to be determined
by some act or event expressed in its limitation, to circumscribe its con-
tinuance, or inferred by the law as bounding its extent." Preston: I Es-
tates, 431: Gillespie v. Broas, 23 Barb. 370. 376; Shaw v. Hoard, j8 0. St.
221.
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event; or become a fee simple absolute if the event is one which
admits of becoming and becomes impossible.27
The books and cases are substantially one in treating the
ending of determinable estates as natural but they do not always
clearly express themselves to this effect. Not infrequently it
is said that these estates are defeated by the happening of the
contingency,28 as though the contingency were something ex-
terior, coming in to cut off the estate before it had run its natural
course. But after all this seems merely a manner of speech.29
Preston makes a clear, and for certain purposes, a very
useful distinction between direct limitations, for example the
limitations of ordinary life estates, and collateral limitations,30
but he points out that "the collateral limitation [just like the
direct limitation] marks the bounds or compass of the estate
and the time of its continuance." Here he is showing how a
limitation differs from a condition. Having shown that a limi-
tation-and a collateral limitation at that-marks the boundary
of an estate, he goes on to say: "The condition [on the other
hand] has its operation in defeating the estate before it attains
the boundary." 31 And so in the more modem books, as in
Challis divides determinable fees into two clases according as they
are liable to determine on (t) a contingency which admits of becoming
impossible to happen, such as the marriage of A, which may become im-
possible by A's death, or (2) a contingency, which if it does not happen,
must forever remain liable to happen; such as the fall of a particular
building. Challis: Real Prop. (3d Ed.), 254.
' Preston: I Estates, 431 (but cf. p. 42) ; Warner v. Tanner, 38 0. St.
uz8; Morris Canal and Banking Co. v. Brown, 27 N. J. L. x3.
" In view of the fact that words of condition have often been treated
as creating a mere limitation (see Leake: Prop. in Land [2d Ed.], x68;
Tiffany: Real Prop., 191), this manner of speech is not surprising. This
situation affords a certain justification for the term "conditional limitation"
as applied to collateral limitations by Sanders, Leake and others.
' See Preston: I Estates, 43, as amplified in Challis: Real Prop. (3d
Ed.), 252: "A direct limitation marks the duration of estates by the life
of a person, by the continuance of heirs, by a space of precise and measured
time; making the death of the person in the first example, the continuance
of heirs in the secbnd example, and the length of the given space in the
third example, the boundary of the estate or the period of duration. A
collateral limitation, at the same time that it gives an interest which may
(by possibility) have continuance for one of the times (marked out) in
a direct limitation, may, on (the happening of) some event which it de-
scribes, put an end to the right of enjoyment during the continuance of
that time."
"Preston: I Estates, 49.
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Tiffany's, "The Modern Law of Real Property." Words of
condition "are considered to provide for the cutting off of the
estate before its regular termination." Whereas "'in the case of
an estate on special [he employs this word rather than "col-
lateral"] limitation, the words of contingency are regarded as
part of the limitation itself, and so as not cutting off an estate
previously limited, but merely marking the quantum of the es-
tate." .12 This is as much as to say that an estate which comes
to an end uporm the-occurrence of a contingency named in the
collateral limitation ends regularly, because its sands have run.
"The only practical distinction between a right of entry for a
breach of condition subsequent and a possibilify of reverter
upon a determinable fee," says the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, "is that in the former the estate in fee does not
terminate until entry by the person having the right while in
the latter the estate reverts at once upon the occurrence of the
event by which it is limited." s3 This is like Blackstone's lan-
guage where, speaking of a determinable life estate, he says
that "whenever the contingency happens" the estate is "abso-
lutely determined and done." '.4 Judge Davis, of the Massa-
chusetts Land Court, speaking of the determinable fee follows
a common practice in using the words "when it has reached its
"Tiffany: Real Prop., i89. "The object of such a limitation is not to
impose a penalty, but to mark the extent of the interest given; against
the terms of which, equity has not power to relieve"--said of an estate
limited to the testator's widow so long as she remained such, in Bennett
v. Robinson, io Watts (Pa.), 348, 351.
'Lyford v. Laconia (i9o8), 75 N. H. 22o, 225; Fuller v. Wilbur, 17o
Mass. 5o6; Re Carnes Settled Estates (j899), i Ch. 324, 329; Re Hope
Johnstone (194), 1 Ch. 4-o; Dickson's Trust. i Sim., N. S., 37, 43, 46;
Doe v. Yates, 5 B. & Ald. 544. In the two preceding, as in many other cases,
the contingency is spoken of as a proviso or condition subsequent, defeat-
ing the estate. But very often words of apjbarent condition create only
limitations. See Leake's treatment of these cases, Prop. in Land (2d Ed.),
16i See the discussion by Hosmer, J., in Wheeler v. Walker, 2 Conn.
196, 2,oo. "The proviso is, in its ordinary construction, one of cesser and
determination only." Scarborough v. Doe, 3 A. & E. 897, 965: "It has
been said that the distinction between words of limitation and words of
condition lies in the terms used; but it is, perhaps, more correct to say
that it depends rather upon the intention and effect than upon the exact letter
of the words." Leake op. cit. i68; Shep. Touch., by Preston. 121, 122.
Owen v. Field, 1o2 Mass. go, io5.
BI.: II Comm., 1x2.
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natural end. '" 3 5  A collateral limitation, quite like a direct
limitation, "marks the period which determines the estate," says
the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Church in Brattle Sq. v.
Grant.36 Or as Professor Gray with others puts it, such an*
estate expires by the terms of its original limitation.8 7 The
thought is similarly expressed by Leake when he says that such
a limitation "operates to determine the estate by the intrinsic
force of the limitation; in the event prescribed by the terms of
the condition [substitute "limitation"] the estate ceases." 38
* It is the common practice to treat determinable life estates
and determinable estates tail as subordinate or modified cate-
gories of life estates proper or estates tail proper.39 This has
advantages-but it has the defects of those advantages. In most
respects determinable life estates are like life estates, and deter-
minable estates tail like estates tail. The rules of law concern-
ing the rights and obligations of the tenant are practically the
same. But from the standpoint of the termination of these es-
tates such treatment tends to cause confusion. It is not to be
wondered at when even a leading text writer who observes that
words of collateral or special limitation merely "mark the quan-
turn of an estate" also observes that "the character of an estate
as one for life is not changed by the fact that it may terminate
on a contingency before the end of the life." That is but follow-
ing in the footsteps of Littleton and Coke. And it follows as
a not surprising consequence that the same text writer is found
saying: "In order to constitute a life estate it is not necessary
that the estate be such that it must continue during the life or
lives named; it being sufficient that it may so continue, though
liable to be cut off 40 by the happening of a contingency before
'First Universalist Church, Petitioner, Mass. Land Ct. .Decisions, 2o9.
n3 Gray, 142, 147.
'Perpetuities, See. z3.
'Leake: Prop. in Land (2d Ed.), i6f.
"In English books an estate tail subject to a collateral limitation is
often spoken of as a fee tail with proviso for ceuser. Leake: Prop. in
Land (2d Ed.), 163.
'The italics are supplied. Compare with this the clear statement of
the effect of the contingency upon a determinable life estate in Harrison
v. Foote, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 576, 58o: "The home as it exists is to continue,
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the termination of such life or lives." Whereas if it had been
the habit to treat ordinary life estates and determinable life
estates as co-ordinate and distinct kinls of freeholds, the tempta-
tion to use the word "cut off," or other words suggestive of and
generally used as meaning a premature termination would have
been slight. But it would be profitless to quarrel with the beaten
track. . .
It is more difficult to surrender to a practice of treating
determinable estates for years as of a kind with the ordinary
estates for years. As has been indicated, that which determines
the nature of the ordinary estate for years is the certainty of
the time of its beginning and its ending. But the ending of a
determinable estate for years is precisely as contingent and may -
be subject to the same quality of contingency as the ending of
an ordinary life estate.4 1  The most familiar illustration 42 of
the determinable estate for years is a lease for twenty-five years
if A shall so long live.4" The statement of Coke that such a
lease is "certain in uncertainty""4 does not much affect the
matter.
but when the use of the land as a home shall cease, the purpose will have
been subserved, and the estate shall determine. This is the substance of
the provision. We think the purpose is to limit the life estate to the
duration of the use as a home. When that terminates, the estate is to
determine." And see the similar exposition, of a determinable fee how-
ever, in Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. 335, 341.
' But a leasehold which is to terminate on the contingency of mere
default by the lessee, even when it is expressly provided that the lease
shall be void in such event, is subject not to a limitation but to a condi-
tion. Tiffany: Real Prop., 193; Gray: Restraints on Alienation, ioz note;
Davenport v. Reg., 3 App. Cas, 11, i28, i3.
'But there are many other illustrations: e. g., a lease during the
minority of the tenant, Bishop of Bath's Case, 6 Co. 35b; a lease de-
terminable upon notice by either party, Doe v. Baker, 8 Taunt. 241; a lease
to cease when the purpose for which it was given has been satisfied, Leake:
Prop. in Land (2d Ed.), x68, a lease to, determine if the city should cut off
the premies, Mungle v. Boston, 3 Allen 28o; a lease to determine if the
lessor shou'ld conclude to build on the premises, Shaw v. Hoffman, 25 MIich.
162, i7;:IAiller v. Levi, 442 N. Y. 489. In Ashley v. Warner, ixi Gray 43,
the interest was held to be a tenancy at will subject to "conditional (col-
lateral) limitation."
"Preston: I Estates, 127. "Upon the death of A, there is no residue
of the term, though there may be a residue of the years, so that a limita-
tion over for the residue of the term is void, unle°as by term is meant the
time and not the interest"; Leake: Prop. in Land (2d Ed.). 166. This
is a plain statement of the distinctions made by Lord Mansfield in Wright
v. Cartwright, i Burr. 282.'*Co.: Lit. 45
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Unlike (ither detenninable estates the determinable fee tail
may be discharged of the collateral contingency at the will of
the tenant himself. The power of tenant in tail to bar the
entail and convey a fee simple, an inseparable incident of the
estate tail, is not affected by the .collateral limitation or proviso
for cesser. The collateral limitation may be destroyed by a
disentailing conveyance just as a remainder expectant upon the
'determination of the estate tail; .or an executory limitation cre-
ated to operate before or after the deterifiination of the estate
tail, or a condition may be." The fee simple which the grantee
takes is not a determinable fee but a fee simple absolute.
It is especially needful to emphasize that the determination
of the determinable fee-when this estate is recognized, as it
generally is in this coutry-is a purely natural termination.
With a few important exceptions the determinable fee may be
subject to, natural cesser on the same kinds of collateral con-
tingencies as a life estate, a fee tail, or an estate for years.46
The rule that a fee may not be made determinable on voluntary
or involuntary alienation is a real and importan.t exception. But
the rule that the contingency must be one which in legal con-
templation might by possibility never happen 47 -is not a real
exception. This rule has its parallels in the rules affecting -the
other determinable estates. If an estate is given to a man for
"Leake: Prop. in Land (2d Ed.), 164; Doe v. Scarborough, 3 A. & E.
897, 965.
'Preston: I Estates, 433.
"So if an estate is given to a man and- his heirs so long as he shatl
pay 20s. annually to A or as long as the Church of St. Paul shall stand,
his estate is a fee simple determinable, in which case he has the whole
estate in him; and such perpetuity of an estate which may continue for-
ever, though at the same time there is a contingency "which when it hap-
pens will determine the estate (which contingency cannot properly be called
a condition, but a limitation) may be termed a fee simple determinable.'
Walsingham's Case, Plowd. 557. As the Church of St. Paul must fall
some time it is obvious that the possibility that the contingency will never
happen is one that is established not by the course of nature, but by law
alone. Some writers have seemed to believe that if the event is one which
must occur in the course of nature, the grantor would have not merely
a possibility of reverter, but a reversion. See Washburn: Real Prop. (M
Ed.), 168-17o; Preston: I Estates, 44o. But see Challis: Real Prop. (3d
Ed.), 251i First Universalist Society v. Boland, 1$5 Mass. '7x, 274; 24
Ency. of the Laws of England, 17o. And compare -with the above refer-
ence to Preston his statement on page 42 of Volume I.
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life determinable upon an event which must happen at a fixed
point of time it would seem plainly enough to be an estate for
years. 48  If land is conveyed to A and his heirs determinable
upon the falling in of one or several lives what would it be
but arestate pur autre %de? The arguments that apply in like
limitations of fees 49 apply here. No estate is a determinable
life estate uxnless it may by possibility endure for life. No fee
tail is a determinable fee tail unless its proviso fee cesser may
by possibility never happen so long as they are heirs of the
body.
But this comparison shouild not obscure the fact that in
certain respects-especially in the rules that no future interest
can be limited upon it at common law,50 and that there is no
reversion expectant upon it-the determinable fee has the quali-
ties of a fee simple.
When a life estate, a fee tail, or an estate for years termi-
natis-whether or not the estate in question is subject to a
collateral limitation, i. e., determiable,-the property passes to
the remainderman or the reversioner. When a determinable
fee terminates, the property reverts to the grantor, who had
"And just so an estate for years to a man and his heirs would not
descend to the heirs of the lessee, but would pass to the lessee's executors."
Littleton: Tenures, Sec. 740.
""In the limitation of a determinable fee, the limitation is expressed
to be made to the grantee and his heirs until the happeuing of some future
event, which must be such a kind that it may by possibility never happen
at all. . . . A limitation to a grantee and his heirs until the happening
of some event which must in the nature of things happen sooner or later,
passes no fee. If the happening of the event, though certain, is not fixed in
point of time-that is, if it depends upon the dropping of a life or lives-
the limitation, as will hereafter be seen, gives rise to an estate Put autre vie.
If the happening of an event is fixed in oint of time, the limitation gives
rise to a term of years, which notwithstanding the naming of the heir,
passes to the executor on the death. of the tenant." Challis: Real Prop.
(3d Ed.), 251.
"'The fee having heen given and passed . . . there is nothing
further for the subsequent limitation to operate upon," Egerton v. Massey,
3 C. B., N. S., 338. See John Chipman Gray, 3 Law Quarterly Review, 401.
"The possible duration of the estate exhausts the fee." 24 Ency. of Laws
of England, 171. And see further .for some hints of qualification, Gray:
Perpetuities, Sec. 13, and Sec. 14, note 5. "No estate can be limited by way
of remainder on the regular expiration of a fee, even though it may be
only a qualified fee which cannot last longer than an estate tail." Smith:
Executory Interests, 165.
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the possibility of reverter." But there is nothing in these facts
to distinguish the nature of the terminiation of these various
estates. Nor is there in the further facts that remainders and
reversions are true estates and generally assignable, whereas a
possibility of reverter is, as its name implies, a mere possibility
and, at common law, is not assignable.52  If an estate is sub-
ject to a limitation, collateral or otherwise, as distinguished
from a condition, or executory limitation, when it ends it does
so by natural expiration, whatever the legal status of the claim-
ant next in line. Even those who deny recognjtion to the de-terminable fee in estates of freehold since the Statute Qtda
Emptores, admit that the estate so long as it was legally recog-
nized was subject to natural. termination.. Thus Professor Gray
says:
"Some estates [before the Statute Quia Emplores] were
terminable by special or collateral limitation; for instance an
estate to A and his heirs until they cease to be tenants of the Manor
of Dale. On the happening of the contingency the feoffor was in
of his old estate without entry. The estate was not cut short, -as it
would have been by entry for breach of condition but expired by
the tirms of its original limitation."
Harold M. Bowman.
Boston University Law School.
According to such writers as Sanders and Leakc, who deny that there
can be a determinable fee since the Statute Quia Etuptores, the land would
revert to the grantor by way of escheat, because as the grantor has given
the entire fee there is no reversionary estate left to him to entitle him to
the possession. Sanders: I Uses and Trusts, 2o8. Leake: Prop. in Land
(2d Ed.), 25. Gray: Perpetuities, Secs. 775-777" But in First Universaljst
Society v. Boland, i55 Mass. 17x, probably the most mentioned American
case in recognition of the determinable fee, it is said: The possibility of
reverter "is in the original grantor"; and "it represents whatever is not
conveyed by the deed, and it is the possibility that the land may revert to
the grantor or his heirs when the granted estate determines."
uSee Gray: Perpetuities, Sec. Y4, n. 5; Tiffany: Real Prop. i9s;
Contra, Sheetz v. Fitzwater, 5 Pa. 126.
" Gray: Perpetuities, Sec. 13. See alsb, Leake: Prop. in Land (2d Ed.),
24. The words of Sanders are: "The estate reverted to the donor, not as
a condition broken, of which the donor, or his heir might take advantage
by entry. but as a principle of tenure, in the nature of on escheat upon the
death of a tenant in fee simple without heirs general." Sanders: I Uses
and Trusts, 209.
